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Summary. Excessive rainfall and extensive flooding within the context of a changing
environment show the fact that resistance to overflowing erosion of embankment dams needs
to be better assessed because of the increasing number of dam failures caused by overflowing,
implying the necessity of a reaction to this kind of challenges. Better understandings of the
embankment failure processes and the dominant parameters affecting these kinds of failures are
necessary for predicting and modeling the breach processes. Acquiring this better
understanding of the physical processes and a numerical prediction capability requires
progressing in parallel in laboratory and field test investigations of embankment breaches and
analyzing case studies of real-life embankment failures. It is interesting to notice an increasing
number of cascade failures that led to the destruction of embankment dams. Even though
cascade reservoirs are built in many river basins nowadays, studies on sequential embankment
dam-break in cascade reservoirs are still few and difficult to perform. Therefore, improving
numerical simulations and risk analyses of cascade reservoir dam breaks are of practical
engineering significance. This paper aims to describe several cascade failures with embankment
dams breaking by overflowing to point out the lessons to learn related to the comprehension of
the main physical processes governing these events.
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INTRODUCTION

Excessive rainfall and extensive flooding within the context of a changing environment show
the fact that resistance to overflowing erosion of embankment dams needs to be better assessed
because of the increasing number of dam failures caused by overflowing, implying the necessity
of a reaction to this kind of challenges. Recent cascade failures of large embankments, like
Edenville and Sanford on May 19, 2020, or Xinfa and Yongan on July 18, 2021, or Annamayya
and Pincha on November 19, 2021, have illustrated, in a cascade scheme, the high risk of failure
by overflowing erosion of the downstream dam when the upstream one breaches, leaving back
not only destructed constructions but often also long-term impacts for water supplies or
irrigation facilities.
Better understandings of the embankment failure processes and the dominant parameters
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affecting these kinds of failures are necessary for predicting and modeling the breach processes.
These predictions are mean topics for emergency preparedness, risk management, and
evacuation procedures, but also for design, implementation, and updates of protection
measures. Acquiring this better understanding of the physical processes and a numerical
prediction capability requires progress in parallel in laboratory and field test investigations of
embankment breaches and also in the analysis of case studies of real-life embankment failures.
It is of interest to notice an increasing number of cascade failures that led to the destruction
of embankment dams. Even though cascade reservoirs are built in many river basins nowadays,
studies on sequential embankment dam breaks in cascade reservoirs are still few and difficult
to perform. Therefore, improving numerical simulations and risk analyses of cascade reservoir
dam breaks are of practical engineering significance.
This paper aims to describe several cascade failures with embankment dams breaking by
overflowing to point out the lessons to learn related to the comprehension of the main physical
processes governing these events.
2

PRESENTATION OF SEVERAL CASE STUDIES OF CASCADE FAILURES OF
DAMS

2.1 Upper and Lower Kohanza Reservoirs, USA, Connecticut
The first written documents concerning the cascade failures of two dams date back to the 1860s.
At this time Danbury in Connecticut/USA had a thriving economy caused by the production of
hats. 2000 hatters in 12 factories turned animal pelts into felt and needed for this process
abundant amounts of water. To satisfy this demand the town built numerous dams and
reservoirs, the first of which was the Lower Kohanza Reservoir constructed in 1860. It was built
by a homogenous earth dam without sealing with a height of 8.2 m, a crest length of 102.4 m,
a top width of 4.0 m, and a storage volume of 0.123 Mm3. Urged by increasing water demands
the residents built 1865 to 1866 the Upper Kohanza Reservoir with larger dimensions. The dam
embankment was also a homogenous earth dam without sealing with a height of 9.4 m, a length
of 183 m, a top width of 5.5 m, and a storage volume of 0.518 Mm3 [1],[2]. For 3 years both
dams were in satisfactory operations as in October 1869 in the upper dam body a crack was
detected but was neglected. 4 months after the detection of the crack, on January 31, 1869, at
7:00 p.m. the dam of the Upper Kohanza Reservoir broke without warning (Figure 1), causing
an ice jam, which flooded the Lower Kohanza Reservoir and destroyed the lower dam [3].

Figure 1. Upper Kohanza Dam after failure.

Figure 2. Danbury after the dam breach flood.

The deluge swept away houses and buildings and destroyed three bridges in a matter of
minutes. Most tragically, the flash flood took the lives of 11 Danbury residents (Figure 2). Both
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dams were rebuilt. Portions of both reservoirs still serve the residents of Danbury and are known
as Upper Kohanza Lake and Lower Kohanza Lake (Figure 3,4).

Figure 3. Upper Kohanza Dam actual view.

Figure 4. Lower Kohanza Dam actual view.

2.2 Lake Eigiau Dam and Coetdy Dam, UK, Wales
In November 1925 the city of Dolgarrog in Wales/UK was to become a scene of a cascade
failure of two dams. In 1907 started the construction of the concrete gravity dam of Lake Eigiau.
The works were interrupted in 1908 and finished between 1910 and 1911. The dam with a
height of 6 m and a length of 990 m stored a reservoir with a volume of 4.5 Mm3 and was made
of a dry mix of concrete, requiring tamping, with inlaid blocks of granite. According to the
design, the foundation of the dam foot should have been made to a depth of 1.8 m below the
surface. Inspections after the failure showed that at the point where the breach occurred, the
foundation block reached only 45 cm into the clay. The foundations of the concrete wall were
not, in general, carried deep enough to form an effective cutoff. The concrete was also of poor
quality and was not watertight. On the evening of November 2, 1925, a blow-out of the lower
part of the concrete dam wall occurred on a length of 9 m, up to a height of 3 m. The failure
happened at a point where a seepage path for several years was existing. No one witnessed the
blowout (Figure 5).

Figure 5. Eigiau Dam after blow-out.

Figure 6. Coedty Dam after failure.

The breach in the concrete Eigiau Dam occurred at 8:45 p.m. The resulting discharge of 1.5
million cubic meters in the first hour caused Coedty Dam, which was built in 1924 only 4.0 km
downstream of Eigiau Dam, to be overflowed and collapse forming a breach 60 m wide at the
top and 18 m wide at the bottom (Figure 6).
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The wall of water, mud, rock, and concrete hit the northern end of Dolgarrog village by 9:15
p.m. Fortunately, most of the villagers were attending the weekly film show held in the village
hall, but still, ten adults and six children died. No warning reached the town as the telephone
line from the operator at Lake Eigiau was washed away. The two dams formed part of a scheme
for hydroelectric power generation at Dolgarrog Power Station for a nearby aluminum factory.
The power station and aluminum works were destroyed [4].
2.3 Panshet Dam and Khadakwasla Dam, India
In 1957 the construction of the Panshet Dam started near the city of Poona in India. The
construction schedule envisaged the completion of the dam in five working seasons by January
1962 but caused by the fact that good progress was achieved during the first two years of
construction, it was decided to complete this embankment dam one year ahead, possibly before
the monsoons of 1961 and accordingly a revised schedule was drawn up. But misfortunes of
the proposed 51.2 m high dam commenced from the early starting of monsoon from 20th June
1961.
The rainfall was very heavy and on June 26 the rainfall recorded was 322.84 mm. Thereafter
it continued to rain intermittently. Rainfall remained heavy during the following weeks, leading
to a rapid filling of the reservoir. The full reservoir level and the spillway crest level at R.L.
628.50 m was reached on July l0 and thereafter the spillway started working.
On July 12, the day of failure, important items of the dam remained incomplete. The height
of the dam in the temporary waste weir section was 1.5 m below the design height. The level
of the core in that section was 4.0 m below the design level and the downstream casing remained
4.9 m below the design level. The trash racks were not fixed, emergency gates were not
installed, and service gates were only kept suspended on wire ropes. The hoisting arrangements
were not installed in the tower with result that the gates could not be operated. The stem rods
were kept on the floor of the tower. The piers of the approach bridge were erected and trusses
on two spans were kept. But the remaining trusses were not installed with the result that no
approach to the tower was possible. Had the approach bridge been completed, the hoisting
arrangement could have been installed, at any rate, before July 12. The upstream retaining wall
was not raised to its designed height at full length. The dividing wall was not constructed at its
full designed length. The floor of the conduit was not concreted. The downstream transition
box was not constructed. The downstream retaining wall also was not constructed.
Arrangements for the disposal of tail water were not fully completed. The upstream pitching
was not fully done. So far as the temporary waste weir section on the upstream side was
concerned, no pitching was done at all, also no pitching was done on the downstream side at
all.

Figure 7. Panshet Dam after failure.

Figure 8. Khadakwasla Dam after failure.
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At about 6:30 a.m. on July 12, 1961, Panshet Dam overflowed. The overflowing water
started eroding the dam section over which it cascaded down to the riverbed. Chunks of
compacted downstream casing and stone pieces from downstream rock toe fell first and finally,
the core crashed and set free 198 Mm3 of storage [5],[6]. The resulting flood wave overflowed
and breached the gravity masonry dam, Khadakwasla located downstream of Panshet dam
(Figure 8).
2.4 Euclides da Cunha Dam and Salles de Oliveira Dam, Brazil
Euclides da Cunha and Salles de Oliveira Dams were constructed respectively in 1960 and
1958 on Rio Pardo in Brazil. Euclides da Cunha dam had a height of 56 m, a crest length of 343
m, a dam volume of 2.2 Mm3, and a reservoir capacity of 13.4 Mm3. Salles de Oliveira, a
homogeneous earthfill dam had a height of 35 m, a crest length of 692 m, a dam volume of 0.6
Mm3, and a reservoir capacity of 25 Mm3. Both dams suffered three weeks of torrential rainfall
and on January 19, 1977, an average precipitation of 180 mm in 24 h was registered. Caused
by human errors the flood gates of Euclides da Cunha Dam were not opened and the
overflowing of the 56.0 m high homogeneous earthfill dam became inevitable. Overflowing
started at 8:30 p.m. on January 19, 1977, and the breach developed on January 20 at 3:30 a.m.
approximately 100 m from the right abutment destroying all the right section of the dam (Figure
9).

Figure 9. Euclides da Cunha Dam after failure. Figure 10. Salles de Oliveira Dam after failure
through overtopping and spillway erosion.

Euclides da Cunha Dam was the first to collapse, releasing more than 13 Mm3 of water into
the Pardo River followed shortly afterward by Armando Salles de Oliveira dam, located 10 km
downstream. (Figure 10). Only 30 minutes later at 4:00 a.m. after the flood arrived at Salles de
Oliveira Dam, adding 25 Mm3 already held in the reservoir, the dam breached. Remarkable is
the fact that Euclides da Cunha Dam sustained a head of about 1.2 m above the crest level for
more than seven hours [7].
2.5 Koedoes River Cascade, South Africa
Exceptionally heavy rains fell over the north-eastern parts of South Africa, Mozambique and
Zimbabwe during February 2000 as tropical cyclone Eline struck these areas and caused among
other impacts the flooding of the Limpopo Province in South Africa. The catchment of one of
the mean rivers in the province, the Koedoes River is part of the Letaba River system. On
Koedoes there existed a series of dams which were all homogeneous earth fills. Koos De Beer
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Dam (17 m high, 325 m long, built 1967), Altenzur Dam (23 m high, 694 m long, built 1956),
Donkerval Dam (16 m high, 255 m long, built 1969), Lebea Dam (18 m high, 445 m long, built
1963) and Fry Dam (18,5 m high, 790 m long, built in 1967) (Figure 11-16).

Figure 11. Koedoes River with dam sites.

Figure 12. Koos de Beer Dam after reconstruction.

On February 14, 2000, at 5:00 a.m. Koos De Beer Dam was the first dam on the Koedoes
River that failed. Altenzur Dam then overflowed and failed also. Donkerval Dam with a storage
capacity of 1.7 Mm3 took over the role of a flood retention system and was able to reduce the
ongoing breach wave. Lebea Dam, which was situated about 7 km downstream failed at 7:10
a.m. as the overflowing level reached 1.0 m above the crest. It took about 30 minutes for the
flood to break through leaving a 75 m wide breach in the embankment. 3 km downstream Fry
Dam also overflowed and as the water level reached 1.0 m above the crest the dam failed and
was emptied within 30 minutes, forming a breach with 120 m in length [8].

Figure 13. Aerial view of Altenzur Dam.

Figure 14. Donkerval Dam today.

2.6 Recent case studies of cascade dam failures
Even in recent times, the dam community faced cascade breaches of dams. At this point, we
should remind the failures of Edenville and Sanford dams in the US on May 19, 2020, Xinfa
and Yongan in China on July 18, 2021, and Annamaya and Pincha in India on November 19,
2021.
2.6.1 Edenville and Sanford Dams, USA
The Edenville and Sanford Dams were two of four dams in Michigan which were located in
series along the Tittabawassee River. The other two were Secord Dam and Smallwood Dam.
All four dams were constructed between 1923 and 1925. Secord is the most upstream of the
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four dams, followed further downstream by Smallwood, Edenville, and, finally, Sanford.The
dam failures of Edenville and Sanford Dams occurred near the end of a three-day rain event.
On May 16, 2020, three days before the failures, the levels of the lakes impounded by all the
four dams were all slightly below normal operating lake elevations. On that day, heavy rain was
predicted in the coming days. Beginning on May 17 and extending through May 19, the
watersheds upstream of the four dams received significant, but not extreme, rainfall. The
analyses of spillway capacity completed before the failure were all based on an assumption that
the spillway gates could be opened sufficiently to allow free flow over the concrete spillway
crests, but this was not the case. The original gate hoist system was conFigure d in a way that
limited the gates to an opening of no more than 2.13 m, while at least 3.05 m of the opening
was needed to allow free flow over the concrete crests. Between 2012 and 2015, the dam
operator fabricated a temporary support system to supplement the original gate hoist system
and demonstrated that with this system the gates could physically be lifted to more than 3.05
m. But in June 2019, a gate operation test resulted in the recommendation that the temporary
support system was stopped to be used because of concern for the safety of the operators and
possible damage to the gates. As a result, during the failure event, the gates at Edenville Dam
were opened only about 2.13 m, with the original hoist system and the sparing use of the support
system. Aware of this long-time weakness of the gate system, plans were in the process for
modifying the gate hoist systems at Edenville Dam in late 2020 to make possible gate openings
to 3.05 m or more, but, unfortunately, the May 2020 event occurred before the hoist systems
were modified.

Figure 15. Lebea Dam after failure.

Figure 16. Fry Dam dried out.

Gate openings of 2.13 m reduced the estimated spillway discharge by about 27 percent
relative to the estimated discharge with 3.05 m openings.
According to the original design drawings, the upstream and downstream slopes of the
embankments were nominally 2.5H:1V (horizontal:vertical) and 2H:1V, respectively.
However, downstream slopes have been flattened and berms have been added in some
locations, survey data showed that the downstream slope was steeper than 2H:1V in some
locations including a slope of about 1.6H:1V in the upper part of the failure section and an
average slope of about 1.8H:1V at that section.
An available excerpt from the original design specifications for this project indicated that
the fill was to be placed and compacted in layers. No compaction equipment was observed in
any of the historical construction photos. Some of these photographs show fill being dumped
from rail carts and trestles. Test borings completed since the 1980s indicated low blow counts
in the embankment soils. Consequently, it appears likely that the embankment soils were not
consistently compacted if compacted at all.
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At about 1:00 a.m. on Tuesday, May 19, the lake impounded by the 15.8 m high and 1868.4
m long Edenville Dam, reached the previous pool of record – the highest lake level previously
recorded – which was about 0.8 m above normal pool level and about 1.2 m below the Edenville
Dam embankment crest elevation. The lake continued to rise throughout that day until the time
of the failure when the lake level was estimated to have been about 1.68 m above normal lake
level, which is about 0.9 m higher than the previous pool of record, and 0.3 to 0.5 m below the
nominal embankment crest elevation.

Figure 17: Edenville Dam during failure.

Figure 18: Sanford Dam after failure.

A video sequence of an eyewitness of the failure sequence showed that a downstream section
of the Edenville dam failed suddenly at about 5:35 p.m. on Tuesday, May 19. The failure section
was 40 to 80 feet wide, measured along the crest. It was documented that the downstream
embankment section failed in less than 10 seconds. An upstream remnant remained standing
for 10 to 20 seconds before it gave way, and the embankment was fully breached. The breach
enlarged over the next few hours, releasing the water stored in the lake into the downstream
Sanford reservoir (Figure 17,18). Caused by the fact that no signs of overtopping or internal
erosion were visible at the failure tape and the impression of the high destruction velocity the
physical mechanism of the failure of Edenville Dam contributed to static liquefaction [9].

Figure 19. Xinfa Dam just before failure.

Figure 20. Yongan Dam after failure.

2.6.2 Xinfa and Yongan Dams, China
Torrential rainfalls caused two dams to fail in Inner Mongolia near the city of Hulunbuir
[10]. The two facilities, known as the Yongan Dam and the Xinfa Dam were in the vicinity
of Hulunbuir city and collapsed on Sunday, July 18, 2021. The impact of the failure was
8
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significant since about 46 Mm3 of water was released causing severe flooding. Their catchment
area received one-third of its annual rainfall in a single day and it happened at a time when the
soil was already nearing saturation following 2 days of rainfall before. Both dams were zoned
earthfill embankments, constructed 1958 and in operation since 1959. The first dam to fail was
Yongan Dam and 40 minutes later also Xinfa Dam failed, which was situated downstream. A
film sequence that showed the failure process of Xinfa Dam documented a high velocity of
breach similar to those of Edenville Dam. (Figure 19,20).
2.6.3 Pincha and Annamayya Dams, India
From 1954 to 1960 in the province of Andhra Pradesh in India, the Pincha Irrigation Project
was constructed. The main construction was Pincha Dam, a 21 m high and 486.3 m long
masonry/earth dam that stored 9.2 Mm3 of water. In 2001 downstream of Pincha Dam the
Cheyyeru Irrigation Project was constructed. Its main construction was Annamayya Dam, an
earthen embankment, 25 m in height, a crest width of 6 m, and a crest length of 426.25 m. The
storage volume of the Annamayya Reservoir was 63.2 Mm3 [11]. Heavy rainfall on November
18, 2021, caused increasing levels in both reservoirs. The design flood of the Annamayya Dam
was 6144 m3/s. Already at 1:00 p.m. on November 18, 2021, the inflow into the Annamayya
Reservoir reached 6512 m3/s. The situation became more serious as the Pincha Dam upstream
failed on Friday, July 19, 2021, at 3:30 a.m., causing the outflow of the complete storage into
Annamayya Reservoir (Figure 22). At 5:30 a.m. the flood wave arrived at Annamayya
Reservoir and increased the inflow to 9061 m3/s. The earthen part of the dam was completely
washed away (Figure 21).

Figure 21. Pincha Dam during failure.
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Figure 22. Annamaya Dam after failure.

LESSONS TO LEARN FROM THESE CASE STUDIES OF CASCADE FAILURES

In cascade hydraulic schemes, the flow evacuation capacity of the downstream dams is rarely
designed to pass the dam-break flood wave of the upstream dams. As the overflowing erosion
of the upstream dam generally happens during an exceptional flood event, the excess flow due
to the upstream dam-break flood wave propagation is adding to a high level of the downstream
reservoir, letting most of the time unavoidable the overflow of the downstream dam. This was
especially the case of the Annamaya dam failure (India, 2021), where the failure of the upstream
dam (Pincha dam) increased the inflow entering in Annamaya reservoir from 6512 m3/s to
9061 m3/s.
Once the overflow of the downstream dam started, the time to breach can vary significantly
from one embankment to another, depending in particular on the resistance to erosion of the
9
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materials constituting the dam body. It was remarkable that Euclides da Cunha dam could
withstand a 1.2m depth overflow for 7 hours before breaching when other embankment dams
breached after having been overflowed for only 30 minutes.
The ability to predict accurately dam-break flood wave propagations in cascade hydraulic
schemes relies on mastering several difficulties, one major being the prediction of the
overflowing erosion kinetics. This parameter is highly dependent on the characteristics and
conditions of the soil constituting the dam body and remains unknown for most of the
embankment dams in operation.
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